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Introduction 
An interesting recent series of papers has attempted to delineate the essential aspects 
of conservatism (Brennan & Hamlin 2004, Müller 2006, Brennan & Hamlin 2006, 
Brennan  &  Hamlin  2014,  Beckstein  2014),  in  a  world  in  which  the  death  of 
conservatism,  or  at  least  the  impossibility  of  being  a  successful  conservative 
politician, has been trumpeted for some time. In these papers, conservatism is stripped 
down to basic components to try to uncover the fundamental philosophical position it 
contains.  Although  many  conservatives  claim  that  they  are  ‘above’,  or  possibly 
‘below’ ideological  or philosophical  questions, and are purely practically focused, 
academic commentary is generally agreed that an ideological or philosophical core 
can be located, and there is a good deal of consensus as to where it lies. 
Even some prominent conservatives would agree that their position is amenable to 
philosophical analysis and dissection. For example, Michael Oakeshott remarked that 
“the common belief that it is impossible … to elicit explanatory general principles 
from what is recognized to be conservative conduct is not one that I share (Oakeshott 
1991b, 407) – although it is noticeable that in that essay Oakeshott goes on to pursue a 
different project, perhaps intending to hint that seeking the essence of conservatism is 
not the sort of project that is likely to uncover important truths. O’Hear makes  a 
similar point – that although one might articulate conservatism into a set of principles, 
it is the kind of exercise that the conservative himself dislikes, because it carries with 
it  the  danger  of  erecting  “principle  and  dogma  over  practice  and  habit”  (O’Hear 
1998). 
However that may be, many of the controversies about the nature of conservatism, 
such as they are, can be dispelled by noting, with Samuel Huntington (1957), that 
conservatism is a situational ideology whose content in any specific setting makes 
essential reference to contingent aspects of that setting, and so it simply should not be 
expected  that  conservatives  across  the  globe  agree  on  policy  matters.  A  written 
constitution codified in a single document is the bedrock of American political life, 
while this would be an innovation in the United Kingdom. Hence conservatives in 
these two polities are likely to disagree over whether a written constitution is a good 
thing. 
In this paper, I wish to comment on the recent contributions to the debate about what 
conservatism is. Like other authors, my aim is to delineate something central or even, Conservatism, Epistemology, Risk and Mind    2 
dare  I  say  it,  essential  to  conservatism  as  very  broadly  defined  as  “an  ideology 
predominantly concerned with the problem of change: not necessarily proposing to 
eliminate it, but to render it safe” (Freeden 1996, 332). As Francis Wilson argued in 
an interesting paper that is worth revisiting (and which I shall revisit in the course of 
this paper), “beyond all doubt, conservatism involves a theory of change” (Wilson 
1941, 30). This is admittedly not the most original part of Wilson’s paper, and indeed 
is not the only desideratum of an account of conservatism. If possible, any account 
should  also  illuminate,  and  make  sense  in  the  context  of,  at  least  some  of  the 
important  political  philosophers  in  the  tradition  of  Burke  and  Oakeshott  which  is 
generally  known  as  the  conservative  tradition.  Given  the  promiscuity  with  which 
politicians and thinkers describe themselves as ‘conservative’ (cf. Brennan & Hamlin 
2004, 676), this is always a bit of a balancing act. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section I will briefly summarise a 
series of papers about conservatism, from Müller, Brennan and Hamlin (including 
their direct response to Müller), and then a further commentary by Beckstein. Next, I 
will consider the importance to conservatism of a bias toward the status quo. Using a 
definition  of  conservatism  that  I  introduced  some  time  ago  (O’Hara  2005)  which 
emphasises scepticism, I will argue that a status quo bias is neither necessary nor 
sufficient  for  conservatism.  In  the  next  section,  I  will  consider  some  of  the 
consequences of the focus on epistemology in definitions of conservatism such as my 
own, arguing that the conservative is neither prevented from acting politically, and 
that sceptical conservatism can inherit some moral force. I end with a brief recap in a 
conclusion. 
The argument unfolds 
One plausible foundation for conservatism was given by Brennan and Hamlin as “a 
disposition that grants the status quo a normative authority by virtue of its being the 
status quo” (Brennan & Hamlin 2004, 676). These authors considered it possible that, 
phrased like this, it might be consistent with other ideological positions, because most 
ideologies – liberalism, socialism, feminism – are concerned with establishing ends, 
whereas  conservatism  thus  described  is  not.  One  could  therefore  be,  as  David 
Cameron  describes  himself,  a  liberal  conservative  (or,  perhaps  more  properly,  a 
conservative  liberal),  if  one  sought  the  ends  of  liberalism  while  simultaneously 
recognising  the  normative  authority  of  the  status  quo.  The  difference  between  a 
conservative and a rival ideologue was conceptualised in terms of utility functions. An 
ends-based ideologue would have a utility function that sloped away steeply from his 
ideal point, so that any position that was not ideal was unlikely to be acceptable either. 
Those of a more conservative disposition would have a more shallowly sloping value 
function, so that even if they recognised an ideal society it was less likely that they 
would value current society very far below it (Brennan & Hamlin 2004, 687). Thus 
built into conservatism is a status quo bias. 
At the same time, Müller set out a more sociological characterisation of conservatism 
that drew on its multifaceted nature,  suggesting it be defined across a set of four 
dimensions  (Müller  2006,  361),  which  would  pay  due  heed  to  the  conservatives’ 
claims to be uncharacterisable by a single set of dispositions or beliefs. 
  The sociological dimension “is simply the ideology or the specific political 
program of a particular social group trying to hold onto its privileges” (2006, 
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  The  methodological  dimension  “is  about  a  carefully  managed  process  of 
change” (2006, 362). 
  The dispositional dimension “is a presumption in favour of the past … and … 
a presumption in favour of the particular” (2006, 362). 
  The  philosophical  dimension  “implies  a  commitment  to  realizing  a  set  of 
substantive values … [which may be] primarily vested in the importance of 
hierarchical  relationships,  or  some  more  or  less  naturalized  conception  of 
inequality” (2006, 363). 
Conservatism  isn’t  a  definite  thing,  but  for  someone  to  be  properly  counted  as  a 
conservative, “at least two of the four dimensions … need to be present” (2006, 363). 
In  a  reply  to  this,  Brennan  and  Hamlin  accepted  the  value  of  Müller’s 
multidimensional approach, but rejected three of the four dimensions as irrelevant, at 
least to the political philosophy task of understanding the rational force or otherwise 
of  the  underlying  ideas.  The  attachment  of  a  person  to  a  political  ideology,  they 
argued, is no doubt interesting for all sorts of reasons, but says nothing about the 
conceptual structure to which he adheres. Hence the sociological dimension, on their 
account, is an expression of self-interest which is only contingently connected to the 
concepts involved (Brennan & Hamlin 2014, 233). 
This is somewhat contentious, perhaps. For example at least one commentator has 
accused  conservatives  of  being  no  more  than  selfish  (Honderich  2005),  while 
(Eccleshall 2003) argued that they are concerned solely with preserving inequalities, 
Worsthorne opined that conservatism is “about satisfying the strong” (Worsthorne 
1978)  and  in  an  early  paper  Wolfe  suggested  that  “there  is  no  such  thing  as 
disinterested conservatism (Wolfe 1923, 236). At least some thinkers over the past 
century have considered that contingent social structures and self-identification with 
particular groups is important, and some (Wolfe, like Müller several decades later) 
thought that understanding interests essential to understanding conservatism.  
Of the other dimensions, Brennan and Hamlin argued that the dispositional dimension 
is  an  aesthetic  attachment  that  is  not  necessarily  political  at  all  (2014,  236). 
Meanwhile, the methodological and philosophical dimensions seem to collapse into 
each other (2014, 237), while they also questioned Müller’s suggestion that hierarchy 
is a foundational methodological value for conservatism. 
Brennan and Hamlin replied with their own analysis of the methodological dimension, 
which is the only one that is really relevant to conservatism as a political philosophy, 
and identified “three distinct ways in which a conservative can relate to underlying 
values or reasons for action” (2014, 234). 
First, a conservative might recognize the same values as the non-conservative 
but have a different attitude or posture relative to those values. We term such a 
conservative an adjectival or postural conservative … 
Second,  a  conservative  might  identify  a  value  (or  values)  that  is  (are)  not 
recognized  by  non-conservatives.  We  term  such  conservatives  substantive 
conservatives,  since  their  conservatism  builds  on  a  substantive  claim  about 
values. … 
Third, a conservative might … differ from the non-conservative in relation to 
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disposition reflects beliefs about the way in which the agreed values fall in the 
world. We term such a conservative a practical conservative. … 
These  three  forms  of  conservatism,  the  postural,  the  substantive  and  the 
practical, may operate in any combination, so that rather than just three types of 
conservative, we may identify a total of seven … . (Brennan & Hamlin 2014, 
234-235). 
Finally, Beckstein weighed in to argue that practical conservatism “does not withstand 
scrutiny” as an option distinct from the other two (2014, 11), and that postural (or, as 
he  termed  it,  adjectival)  conservatism  “is  an  insufficient  basis  for  claims  to  true 
conservatism”  (2014,  13),  and  so  substantive  (or,  as  he  termed  it,  nominal) 
conservatism is all we have left. I shall examine his arguments in more detail later. 
The  conservative,  properly  so  called,  is  therefore  a  substantive  conservative  who 
recognised at least one distinct value, which entails a positive bias in favour of the 
status quo. Conservatism means “to attach a value to the status quo because it is the 
status quo” (2014, 15). This does not narrow down the options for conservatism as far 
as it might – there are plenty of status quos (and hence the situational and relative 
aspects  of  conservatism  highlighted  by  Huntington  are  respected),  and  indeed 
different aspects of the status quo may be highlighted by different thinkers. 
Status quo bias 
The idea of a status quo bias is conceivable and defensible, and was ably described by 
Gerry Cohen (2011). Cohen’s analysis rests on three aspects of the value of existing 
things. First of all, they have value in virtue of its relationships to existing people. 
Second, they have value as particular valuable things (as opposed to being valuable 
because of the value they hold). Third, we shouldn’t view everything as something to 
be  potentially  shaped  by  us.  Destruction  of  something  valuable  is  not  bad  solely 
because of the removal of some value from the world; removal of the thing in which 
that value inhered is an extra burden. And indeed evidence from psychology indicates 
that liking the familiar is a good adaptive response. In a dangerous world, it makes 
sense for an organism to react cautiously to novel stimuli, but it is also adaptive to 
begin to enjoy a stimulus if it becomes familiar and has not caused harm previously 
(Zajonc 2001). 
Brennan and Hamlin were “drawn to the idea” (2014, 234), while Beckstein argued 
that “the attribution of existence value to the status quo is clearly distinct from doubts 
about policy outcomes and ends” (2014, 9). Yet the relationship between a status quo 
bias and the philosophy of conservatism is not quite so clear to me. 
Firstly, there is the question of how we should judge aspects of the status quo which 
are not valuable, or of negative value. If we love something valuable because it exists, 
what attitude should we have toward something horrible – should we love it because it 
exists, or despise it because it exists? What is the conservative bias towards things of 
negative  value?  In  favour  of  preservation?  Or  in  favour  of  destruction?  Is  the 
existence important, or is it the value? 
Secondly,  there  is  the  obvious  point that  the  status  quo  is  a  deeply  complex  and 
dynamic set of states of affairs and power relations, and furthermore we must accept it 
over potentially varying periods of time. Do we accept the status quo of the moment, 
or the week, or the year, or of a culturally-determined decade (the swinging sixties)? 
In some communities, traditional hierarchies are removed for a period annually – for Conservatism, Epistemology, Risk and Mind    5 
example,  the  festival  of  Saturnalia  in  Ancient  Rome  where  values  were  inverted, 
masters  served  their  slaves,  no  work  was  done  and  no  justice  administered. 
Presumably it would not be conservative to include the status quo obtaining during 
that  period  as  part  of  the  bias.  Similarly,  the  status  quo  has  many  attributes  and 
properties – which are important, and which can be disregarded? Or do we accept 
everything current has implicit value? 
In asking these two questions, we can see that the value-matrix of existing institutions, 
practices, dispositions and relationships is surely important, as well as their existence. 
It is not simply their existence per se that adds value to any existing value; this is a 
crude representation. We must also wonder which of their aspects confer value, and 
decide which things, or aspects of things, have positive value. Simply valuing the 
status quo for its existence seems rather to disconnect it from the value placed in it by 
existing people, which is presumably not the intention. How would a conservative 
discriminate between the fishing industry and the steel industry, were industrial policy 
to come under his purview? Which should be saved? Surely both, on this account. But 
even  a  conservative  must  be  able  to  make  policy  distinctions  between  them.  Of 
course, all commentators would accept that, but conceiving authentic conservatism as 
effectively involving a status quo bias creates an extra question for the conservative to 
answer. 
Neither  of  these  two  questions  is  fundamentally  problematic  –  solutions  to  these 
issues will no doubt present themselves in particular contexts. However, we do need 
to  pursue  the  issue  of  whether  substantive  conservatism  is  sufficient  for  a  clear 
account of conservatism. 
Scepticism and risk 
One of the alternative models of conservatism in Brennan and Hamlin’s analysis is 
postural  or  adjectival  conservatism,  premised  on  “risk  aversion  in  the  face  of 
uncertainty” (Beckstein 2014, 8). Certainly there are versions of conservatism that 
emphasise risk management, and at the cost of appearing narcissistic I shall quote my 
own  (O’Hara  2005,  2007,  2011),  in  which  conservatism  is  broken  down  into  a 
knowledge principle and a change principle. Neither is sufficient for a conservative 
philosophy. 
The knowledge principle is as follows: 
…  because  society  and  its  mediating  institutions  are  highly  complex  and 
dynamic with natures that are constantly evolving as they are co-constituted 
with  the  individuals  who  are  their  members,  both  data  and  theories  about 
society are highly uncertain. (O’Hara 2011, 49-50). 
Uncertainty  on  its  own  is  not  enough  for  conservatism.  It  does  not  constrain  the 
politician  in  any  way  –  indeed,  as  Ulrich  Beck  argues,  politicians  can  often  be 
“condemned to respond”, pushed into taking action, any action, by adverse media 
reaction (Beck 2009, 41), and as a class they have not exactly adopted a humble 
attitude  following  their  frequent  policy  failures  (King  &  Crewe  2013).  Someone 
uncertain about the effects of a proposed policy might easily reason that they will 
implement  the  policy  as  it  might,  for  all  they  know,  turn  out  much  better  than 
expected. 
Hence an extra nostrum is required to furnish a rationale for opposition to change, as 
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… because the current state of society is typically undervalued, and because the 
effects  of  social  innovations  cannot  be  known  fully  in  advance,  then  social 
change (a) must always risk destroying beneficial institutions and norms, and 
(b) cannot be guaranteed to achieve the aims for which it was implemented. It 
therefore  follows  that  societies  should  be  risk-averse  with  respect  to  social 
change,  and  the  burden  of  proof  placed  on  the  innovator,  not  his  or  her 
opponents. It also follows that change, when it does come, should ideally be 
(a) incremental,  (b) reversible  where  possible,  and  (c) rigorously  evaluated 
before the next incremental step. (O’Hara 2011, 88-89) 
In my book I argued that these two principles together are sufficient for a conservative 
philosophy, and indeed that many points of conservative consensus are entailed by 
them, at least in the context of a reasonably well-off and peaceful democracy such as 
the one in  which I live. In this paper, I shall refer to the conjunction  of the two 
principles as kp+cp. At this stage, I do not assume this is a conservative philosophy in 
the light of the argument in (Beckstein 2014), who recognises kp+cp as an adjectival, 
and therefore not ‘true’, conservatism. 
There are three important points to note about kp+cp. First of all, there is a strong 
epistemological component running through them. This is of course obvious given 
that the first principle is a statement about our knowledge of society, or lack of it. 
Data and theory are flawed. Even in the big data age, the conservative will strongly 
resist claims to understanding and knowledge. The risks that the conservative detects 
in innovation, alluded to in the change principle, follow from that uncertainty. The 
risk of destroying value is ever-present, while the probability that innovation will 
achieve  its  ends  is  systematically  overestimated  by  its  proponents.  This  kind  of 
adjectival  conservatism  not  only  raises  the  bar  to  innovation,  but  also  strongly 
challenges the calculable cost/benefit view of politics put forward by the rationalist. 
Sure, we can still see politics as an attempt to balance costs and benefits, but these 
principles undermine any claim that such a balance is ultimately computable with any 
certainty. As Burke put it, “I am not possessed of an exact measure between real 
service and its reward” (quoted in Stanlis 1961, 266, and see Stanlis’ argument about 
the contrast between Burkean prudence and Benthamian expediency). 
The second point to note is that the value whose destruction is risked, it should be 
clear, is not fixed by this definition. Here, the definition takes note of conservatism’s 
situational  nature.  The  values  in  question  –  which  could  be  moral,  economic, 
nationalistic,  religious  or  whatever  –  will  depend  on  what  a  particular  society  or 
culture valorises. The conservative, on this reading, holds some values dear, but these 
will not identify him as a conservative (i.e. in the substantive sense). The values he 
holds will be, all things being equal, (some of) those that matter in his home society or 
culture. Any conservative is such that there exists a value that he holds, but it is not 
the case that there is a value such that all conservatives hold it. 
He is unlikely to want to reason very deeply or in very complex terms about such 
values. The knowledge principle implies that there are limits to the certainty which 
can be produced by moral, ethical or other types of deontic reasoning, even though we 
may be tempted to do such reasoning. Hence the difficulties and complexities that 
progressive thinkers are wont to raise are usually dismissed. As Burke put it, “there 
are some fundamental points in which nature never changes – but they are few and 
obvious,  and  belong  rather  to  morals  than  to  politicks”  (Burke  1887,  468),  while 
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rests on a few very simple ideas; so simple they must be as old as the hills” (Conrad 
1912, xxi). 
This epistemological thread in adjectival conservatism is important, but we must ask 
not whether adjectival conservatism is as weak as commentators such as Beckstein 
suggest,  but  rather  whether  it  is  restricted  to  epistemological  claims.  Can  it  say 
something important about politics? 
Does the sceptical conservative exhibit a status quo bias? 
The  immediate  task  is  to  respond  to  Beckstein’s  argument  (2014,  11-13)  that 
adjectival conservatism is insufficient to be called truly conservative. The adjectival 
conservative may act like a conservative without actually being one, when external 
circumstances happen to be such that he is drawn to conservative actions or attitudes 
which may not obtain in different circumstances. The existing social order is indeed 
such a contingent circumstance, and so a liberal may be drawn to do not very much in 
a  liberal  society.  The  proof  of  the  pudding,  as  Beckstein  argues,  is  what  the 
liberal/conservative would do in a socialist society (say), in which he might begin to 
agitate for change. His failure to pursue change in the actual society he finds himself 
in doesn’t make him a conservative. On the other hand, if he behaves exactly the same 
in the socialist society despite not believing in socialism, then he could reasonably 
claim to be a conservative. 
But does it follow that in the latter case “he or she must be a nominal conservative, 
who is inclined to defend the status quo” (Beckstein 2014, 12-13)? Well, yes and no. 
Is kp+cp a species of substantive conservatism? 
The knowledge principle and the change principle together make important claims 
about the status quo. As expressed in (O’Hara 2011), they entail at least the following 
points. 
  Data  and  theories  about  the  status  quo  are  highly  uncertain.  Therefore  the 
status quo is not properly understood. 
  The  status  quo  is  undervalued  by  non-conservatives.  “Criticism  is  almost 
baffled  in  discovering  the  defects  of  what  has  not  existed;  and  eager 
enthusiasm, and cheating hope, have all the wide field of imagination in which 
they may expatiate with little or no opposition” (Burke 1968, 280). Broadly 
speaking, the ideologue who focuses on a particular end detects its absence in 
existing  society.  This  then  becomes  a  key  aim  of  the  ideologue’s  policy, 
because  of  his  one-dimensional  yardstick  of  what  constitutes  a  successful 
society.  On  the  other  hand,  the  conservative  eschews  the  idea  of  society 
having ends at all (Oakeshott 1975), and so – though he may well be critical of 
existing society – he is also appreciative of its positive aspects without a sense 
of contradiction. 
  The positive aspects of the status quo are threatened by innovation. 
  The  negative  aspects  of  the  status  quo  may  well  not  be  addressed  by  the 
planned innovation. 
  Change, by being incremental and reversible where possible, should (where 
possible) make it feasible to regain the current status quo were the innovation 
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Now, I don’t know whether this constitutes a status quo bias. Certainly this sort of 
conservative is not going to go about challenging the status quo without good reason, 
and will be able to furnish a series of arguments that make it more difficult for the 
innovator to alter the status quo. It may be that this does constitute a status quo bias. If 
it does, then it may also be that this sort of conservative is ipso facto a nominal or 
substantive conservative. However, it does seem that this status quo bias is derivative 
from the epistemological and other themes contained in kp+cp, rather than being first 
order. I am not fully confident in this judgment, but that seems to suggest that such a 
conservative is most likely not a substantive conservative, in that any status quo bias 
is derived from principles and values that are not unique to him. 
In particular, the conservative himself would argue strongly that he does not have a 
status quo bias. His claim is that he values the status quo properly, while his opposing 
ideologues have a bias against the status quo. Again, it’s not immediately clear to me 
from the discussions of Cohen, Brennan and Hamlin whether or not they would class 
this conservative’s attitude as a positive status quo bias. 
Is kp+cp a species of practical conservatism? 
Kp+cp looks very like a species of adjectival conservatism, as it is pitched in terms of 
risk  and  epistemological  scepticism.  It  is  not  obviously  a  species  of  substantive 
conservatism, as it does not incorporate values that are distinctive to conservatives, 
and does not obviously display a status quo bias. The definition does imply some 
crossover with the class of practical conservatives, in that the definition contains the 
empirical claim that the status quo is typically undervalued, especially by innovators, 
progressives and rationalists. 
This claim is not essential; there are at least two other options. It is possible to flesh 
out the relation between kp+cp and the status quo using, not an empirical claim, but 
an epistemological one (albeit a disputed one). An adjectival conservative could adopt 
the so-called principle of methodological conservatism (an idea from the philosophy 
of science that is at best a distant cousin of political conservatism), which maintains 
that,  given  our  interconnected  belief  set  is  highly  coherent,  the  very  fact  that  a 
proposition is believed becomes a reason to believe it (or, perhaps better, becomes a 
reason  not  to  reject  it,  thereby  raising  the  bar  for  a  competing  hypothesis  that  is 
equally justified by the evidence). Perhaps the most famous proponent of this idea is 
Quine (Quine 1980, Quine & Ullian 1978), and we can take a handy formulation from 
Sklar. 
If you believe some proposition, on the basis of whatever positive warrant may 
accrue  to  it  from  the  evidence,  a  priori  probability,  and  so  forth,  it  is 
unreasonable to cease to believe the proposition to be true merely because of the 
existence  of,  or  knowledge  of  the  existence  of,  alternative  incompatible 
hypotheses whose positive warrant is no greater than that of the proposition 
already believed. (Sklar 1975, 378) 
So the adjectival and methodological conservative could argue, not that the status quo 
is undervalued by rationalists, but rather that in the absence of powerful evidence in 
favour  of  the  rationalists’  contention,  it  is  irrational  to  reject  the  reasons  and 
motivations for preserving the status quo. This is not an empirical claim, and so such 
an adjectival conservative would not necessarily be a practical conservative. 
Having said that, maybe this is not an enticing proposition, for two reasons. First of 
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(Christensen 1994), so the adjectival conservative would be picking a fight on away 
ground. Secondly, as  a matter of fact, many conservatives  do make the empirical 
claim about rationalists undervaluing the status quo. 
The second alternative is  to  deny the legitimacy  of the innovation,  and place the 
burden of proof on the innovator. Oakeshott simply digs in his heels: 
… this condition of human circumstance is, in fact, current, and … we have 
learned to  enjoy it and how to manage it; … we are … adults who do not 
consider themselves under any obligation to justify their preference for making 
their own choices; and … it is beyond human experience to suppose that those 
who rule are endowed with a superior wisdom which discloses to them a better 
range of beliefs and activities and which gives them authority to impose upon 
their subjects a quite different manner of life. (Oakeshott 1991b, 427) 
Oakeshott here doesn’t go as far as Cohen, in that he doesn’t say that “this condition 
of human circumstance” is actually better because it is “in fact, current”, but rather 
that no-one has the right to change it. This is a line that an adjectival conservative 
could  take  which  makes  no  empirical  claim.  However,  even  if  the  conservative 
endorses Oakeshott’s claim, it is arguable that this is not an attractive position to hold 
in  a  vibrant  21
st  century  democracy  for  two  reasons.  First  of  all,  this  principle 
provides  no  reason  to  dissuade  the  authorities  from  innovating,  particularly  in 
societies where innovation is popular. There is stubbornness in Oakeshott’s claim, but 
no ground for resistance. Secondly, once more the debate will ultimately devolve to a 
wider controversy, discussed in some depth in (Oakeshott 1975), between two roles of 
government – as civitas (a neutral government which holds the ring for civil society) 
and universitias (an activist government which imposes its own agenda). The claim in 
(Oakeshott 1991b) depends on government restricting itself to the civitas role, which 
by his own admission is against the historical trend. And if a government with its own 
agenda has popular support (which many arguably do), then it is not clear that this 
kind of conservative has much of a response. 
Arguments that the sceptical conservative is not a true 
conservative 
However that may be, it does seem to follow from the knowledge principle that at 
least part of Beckstein’s argument fails to hit the mark. He argues that “uncertainty 
about policy outcomes and goals is, to a very large extent, on any reasonable account 
…  a  kind  of  external  contingent  circumstances.  …  A  person  who  had  not  been 
inclined  to  promote  innovation  in  a  situation  characterized  by  conditions  of 
uncertainty related to policy goals or outcomes, and is equally disinclined to promote 
innovation once those conditions have become much more favourable, cannot be an 
adjectival  conservative  only.  He  or  she  must  be  a  nominal  conservative  too” 
(Beckstein 2014, 13). 
Yet this unfortunately will fail to provide a test for the adjectival conservative who 
denies that the epistemological conditions could ever become more favourable. The 
uncertainty is endemic, on the adjectival conservative’s account. So this kind of test of 
the conservative’s propensity for conservatism, where the adjectival and the nominal 
conservatives can be pitted against each other in a game, can never happen because 
only one of the two sets of conditions can possibly obtain. 
However, a simulacrum of this test can be imagined, and the adjectival conservative 
will  fail  it.  Suppose  the  status  quo  is  lousy  (Syria  2014,  say).  Then  the  risk  of Conservatism, Epistemology, Risk and Mind    10 
innovation  is  correspondingly  lower,  whatever  level  of  uncertainty  obtains 
(presumably quite high in a place like Syria). The conservative of the type we are now 
discussing will certainly not be “equally disinclined to promote innovation.” In fact, 
he may welcome it. The risk of lousing up a lousy status quo is far less than the risk of 
lousing up a pleasantly functioning society. However, this test does not compare two 
different states of uncertainty, as Beckstein suggests, but rather two different qualities 
of life. Some judgments will be more certain – it is relatively certain that the status 
quo in Syria currently is a lot worse than the status quo in Luxembourg currently, 
although such is the complexity of modern societies that no doubt some people, even 
some Syrians and Luxembourgeois could be found to dispute such assertions. 
So  the  status  quo  bias  is  not  entrenched  in  conservatism  of  this  stripe,  but  is 
conditional, as argued by Wilson who points out that “in no state of society have all 
interests  reached  an  equilibrium  which  permits  of  complete  coöperation  and  no 
struggle. In this sense, conservatism represents a functional value in existence, since 
the stability of a conservative society is a situation in which the conflict of interests 
and wills is muted and restricted” (Wilson 1941, 29). In other words, the conservative 
tends to be biased towards the status quo when everyone else is too. Existence value 
has to be significant, and the institution or structure must contribute to stability, before 
the conservative undertakes to defend it. 
Beckstein allows that “one could argue that risk and uncertainty qualify not simply as 
possible  contingent  circumstances  …  but  are  permanent  features  of  the  human 
condition”  (2014,  13),  which  I  indeed  do.  But  there  are  still  three  additional 
arguments against adjectival conservatism in Beckstein’s paper to be addressed. They 
are structured so that each in sequence is a generalisation of the previous one. Hence 
refuting the final one should be sufficient to establish our purpose, but the discussion 
will  be  clearer  if  we  take  the  arguments  in  order.  Let  us  consider  whether  the 
intuitions they trade on are valid in the case of a person who subscribes to kp+cp. 
First, there is the example of Hilda (Beckstein 2014, 13-14). Hilda is a communist, 
but  because  she  realises  that  policies  that  move  in  her  direction  are  unlikely  to 
succeed and may even put off the glorious day still further into the future, she has 
made  the  bizarre  decision  to  join  the  CDU.  Beckstein  argues  that  she  is  not  a 
conservative; instead she is risk averse, all the while reasoning strategically. Yet Hilda 
surely does not buy into kp+cp. She doesn’t accept the knowledge principle at all; it is 
because she (believes she) knows about the current, future and hypothetical states of 
society that she eschews moves toward change. She is risk averse, but has not adopted 
a  sceptical  epistemology.  She  also  does  not  accept  the  conditions  of  the  change 
principle – she does not believe that she undervalues the status quo, does not believe 
that  she  risks  destroying  beneficial  institutions,  and  actively  believes  that  the 
suggested radical policies will fail to correct the problems they are intended to. Her 
caution is soundly based in her own certainty. The combination of kp+cp completely 
fails to characterise Hilda’s political logic. Although she outwardly appears to behave 
like one, she is not a conservative (of this type). Intuition is saved. 
The  second  argument  is  that  because  Hilda  isn’t  alone,  the  adjectival  view  of 
conservatism  would  “suffer  from  conceptual  overstretch”  (Beckstein  2014,  14). 
Moderate  members  of  most  political  parties  would  fall  under  the  definition  of 
conservatism (although this is contemplated by Brennan and Hamlin (2006) without 
too  much  of  an  outrage  to  their  intuition,  so  these  are  complex  matters  and  our 
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indeed  it  would  be  helpful  –  between  a  conservative  properly  so-called,  and  an 
adherent of another ideology who happened to reason conservatively is not clear. The 
knowledge  and  change  principles  as  I  drafted  them  above  are  intended  to  appeal 
across  political  divides,  or  at  least  to  be  hard  for  ideological  opponents  of 
conservatism to deny. Beckstein is concerned in his own paper with defining ‘true’ or 
‘authentic’ conservatives, and his project is intended to draw that distinction as clearly 
as possible. 
It  doesn’t  seem  to  me  outrageous  that  someone  who  cleaved  to  an  ends-based 
ideology might still be called conservative, if he often reasoned in the cautious way 
set  out  in  kp+cp.  His  end-based  ideologue  colleagues  might,  however,  balk  at 
someone who always advised them not to act. Someone who reasoned in this way 
regularly  would  have  a  pretty  watery  commitment  to  an  idealistic  redrawing  of 
society’s  structures  and  institutions.  He  would  also  believe  that  his  theory  about 
society was highly uncertain (not just that that there was a risk in applying it – by the 
knowledge principle, he would have no confidence in the truth of the theory itself). 
He would believe not just that innovating was a risk, but also, by the change principle, 
that  the  current  state  of  society  is  typically  undervalued  by  political  thinkers, 
including presumably his fellows. He would not believe that his  party’s proposed 
policies could be guaranteed to address all the problems that they were intended to, 
and would be worried about their unintended consequences. 
In short, he would not be a very strong ideologue, and his political thought would be 
highly conservative in character. He might be better characterised as a conservative 
whose values were congruent with another ideological group – for example, he might 
hold dear a value such as liberty or equality or the promotion of his nation, but he 
would  clearly  have  very  little  confidence  in  his  own  ability,  or  the  ability  of  his 
comrades, to  achieve those ends.  To that extent,  he would  sound  very much like 
Montaigne. 
To speak frankly, it seems to me that there is  a great deal of self-love and 
arrogance in judging so highly of your opinions that you are obliged to disturb 
the public peace in order to  establish them, thereby introducing those many 
unavoidable  evils  and  that  horrifying  moral  corruption  which,  in  matters  of 
great  importance,  civil  wars  and  political  upheavals  bring  in  their  wake  – 
introducing them moreover into your own country. Is it not bad husbandry to 
encourage so many definite and acknowledged vices in order to combat alleged 
and disputable error? Is any kind of vice more wicked than those which trouble 
the naturally recognized sense of community? (Montaigne 1991, 135) 
Of course, Montaigne’s status as a conservative is a matter of dispute, but his public-
facing scepticism is, I would argue, at a bare minimum an important inspiration for 
conservative thought. The person that Beckstein describes, if he subscribes to kp+cp, 
would be motivated by thoughts very like those of the sceptical Montaigne, and if the 
conservative  tradition  wished  to  claim  Beckstein’s  hypothetical  realo  for  itself,  it 
would surely have a strong case. 
The third argument is that there is an undistributed middle fallacy in play, and that the 
champion of adjectival conservatism is confusing conservatism with risk aversion, 
based on their very similar behaviour (Beckstein 2014, 14). However, kp+cp has more 
content than merely a description of behaviour – it involves a set of attitudes to other 
ideologies, to the status quo, to theory and data, and so provides enough context to 
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This  leads  us  to  the  question,  implicit  through  this  discussion,  whether  kp+cp  is 
sufficiently focused to count as a version of adjectival conservatism (as opposed to a 
more  complex  type  of  conservatism  with  adjectival  and  substantive  aspects).  My 
intuition  here  is  that  kp+cp  is  largely  epistemological  and  sceptical,  with  a  few 
observations about political opponents and the complexity of society thrown in for 
good  measure.  It  says  very  little  about  values,  and  is  as  written  consistent  with 
someone having green or feminist or liberal values at the heart of their philosophy. So 
I would assert that kp+cp is an adjectival stance (Beckstein 2014, 8, places it there) 
which is moreover entirely sufficient for someone to be a conservative properly so 
called. 
Is a status quo bias sufficient? 
The conclusion of the above is that a status quo bias is not necessary for someone to 
be a conservative. Let us now ask the converse question: whether exhibiting a status 
quo bias is sufficient to demonstrate conservatism. Let’s take a limiting case where 
social scientists in a society consider that they have a quantifiable understanding of 
human value that, if not  completely  certain,  is  at  least  considered by all as  good 
enough  for  policymaking.  Suppose  there  was  an  institution  which  had  been  in 
existence for a sufficiently long period of time for a conservative to adopt it as one of 
his own. Suppose the social scientists determine that the value of the institution is 15 
utils  per  person  over  the  population  as  a  whole,  but  the  conservative,  being 
conservative, argues that it has an extra existence value of 5 utils pp more, hence 20 
utils pp. Now an innovator comes along with a design for a potential institution to 
replace  the  existing  one.  The  conservative  is  dubious,  but  the  social  scientists 
determine that the value of this new institution will be 21 utils pp. The conservative, 
who accepts  a status  quo bias but  holds no distinctively sceptical  epistemological 
position, is now forced to agree that the new institution is OK really, and accepts the 
replacement of the old one. This is surely most odd, and not terribly conservative in 
fact or spirit. The status quo bias adds a little friction to the world of innovation, but 
not necessarily terribly much. It raises the bar, but otherwise acquiesces in the same 
determinable calculations of costs and benefits as the unconservative rationalists. 
This does seem to be implied as a possibility by the specification given in (Brennan & 
Hamlin 2004, 679), where “one possible ‘reduced form’ of conservatism” has the 
following normative valuation function: 
W(Xi) = V(Xi) – a(Xs – Xi)
2 
where a > 0, Xs is the status quo, Xi is an arbitrary social state of which V(Xi) is its 
normative value and W(Xi) is its overall, all-things-considered, value. The subtrahend 
is always positive, so the greater the difference between the status quo and a possible 
social state, the greater the amount shaved off the latter’s normative value. But if 
V(Xi)  was  provably  great  enough,  W(Xi)  might  still  prove  large  enough  for  the 
conservative to countenance, and indeed welcome, change. 
The point is not that the conservative would accept change – that naturally happens, as 
all commentators accept. And of course few conservatives would work with such a 
formulation, as Brennan and Hamlin themselves point out. But what is relevant is that 
no  conservative  would  even  countenance  such  a  position.  These  numbers,  the 
conservative would say, cannot be filled in. The conservative’s bias in favour of the 
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described by this kind of reasoning, because the conservative does not and will not 
reason in this way (implicitly nor explicitly). 
In  other  words,  although  Brennan  and  Hamlin  are  properly  aware  that  their 
characterisation is not explicit in conservative writings, we can go further and suggest 
that the outcomes of their characterisation won’t happen either. If the conservative 
happened to behave in such a way as to instantiate this valuation function, then he 
would find himself on occasion arguing that an innovation should be made because 
either V(Xi) was high enough or that (Xs – Xi)
2 was low enough. The status quo bias 
that the function subtends may feel conservative, but allowing reasoning about these 
terms into political discourse does not. The square of the differences may possibly be 
meaningful from a conservative point of view, but conservatism seems doomed if the 
V function is given any kind of credence as a useful parameter. At a minimum, the 
suggestion that these two terms might be commensurable and quantifiable (or might 
behave  as  if  they  are  in  conservative  discourse)  will  put  the  conservative’s 
conservatism under threat the moment he accepts it as plausible. 
Thus  this  suggestion  threatens,  not  to  define,  but  to  undermine  the  conservative 
project altogether. Again, there is a lesson from Wilson’s work, where he asserts that 
“conservatism is not necessarily a defense of the status quo” (Wilson 1941, 39). His 
own suggestion, in support of that statement outlines different classes of conservatism 
in such a way as to provide some support for Brennan and Hamlin’s ontology. He 
argues for: 
… the proposition that … there is a primary and a secondary conservatism. The 
primary  or  fundamental  conservatism  is  broad  in  its  nature,  though  it  is 
constantly intermingled with the secondary or non-essential features of change. 
The conservative may well insist on the principle of private property while not 
maintaining  the  present  system  of  the  relations  of  production.  …  [As  an 
example] the Catholic Church is a defender of private property, though it cannot 
be  said  that  the  Church  is  a  believer  in  the  current  system  of  capitalistic 
production. (Wilson 1941, 33) 
So there are key values or broad structures which the conservative will generally wish 
to preserve, while making concessions on secondary issues (Wilson 1941, 40). As 
well  as  private  property,  the  common  law,  sound  money,  freedom  of  speech  and 
worship, representative democracy, a multicameral Parliament, limited liability and 
the suppression of ex post facto law might count as broad principles of such kind. A 
conservative  (in  the  United  Kingdom)  might  defend  all  of  these,  while  accepting 
(secondary) changes to their implementation, or small measures that are inconsistent 
with the broad principles yet insufficient to threaten them seriously. Using Wilson’s 
nomenclature,  Burke  looks  like  a  primary  conservative,  able  to  defend  the 
revolutionaries of 1688 and 1776, and to advocate far-reaching changes to Britain’s 
colonial  governance  during  the  Warren  Hastings  trial,  because  these  innovations 
actually preserved enduring principles that the short-sighted government of the day 
was undermining. The French Revolution, however, was not an innovation of that 
character. 
In these terms, Brennan and Hamlin’s substantive conservative looks like the defender 
of the status  quo against even the secondary changes. Could it be argued against 
Wilson’s own assessment that the primary conservative that he describes is also prone 
to the status quo bias, and is therefore also a substantive conservative? In that case 
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substantive  conservative,  distinguished  from  each  other  by  the  different  level  of 
abstraction from which they consider the status quo. 
However, as the example of Burke suggests, it seems counterintuitive that the status 
quo  can  be  properly  described  at  such  a  high  level  of  abstraction.  Only  a  very 
unconstrained understanding of the term ‘status quo’ could lead one to suggest that 
the Glorious Revolution or the American Revolution left it unchanged. As Wilson 
argues with respect to inequality: 
Conservative emphasis has tended to approve the fact of inequality, but it has 
also accepted changes in the structure of inequality in any society. If inequality, 
and  its  obverse,  power,  remains  a  fundamental  similarity  in  historical 
continuity, there is no argument implied that either X or Y ought to be members 
of the élite. (Wilson 1941, 31) 
In this example, the conservative wishes to preserve inequalities – yet the ordering of 
wealth and power could change relatively dramatically, thereby upending the status 
quo, within that rubric. 
We should of course be careful of concluding too much from this analysis, based as it 
is on a tiny sample of writings about conservatism. Yet two thoughts occur which it is 
hard to dispel. Firstly, the type of substantive conservative described by Brennan and 
Hamlin, differing in values from his fellows and exhibiting the status quo bias, is a 
rather narrowly-defined type of person, not typical of conservative thinkers in the 
tradition. Is a substantive conservative conservative at all? Beckstein argues that the 
substantive conservative is the only candidate for the ‘true’ conservative; Brennan and 
Hamlin don’t go that far, but certainly contend that such a figure is conservative. On 
the other hand, Wilson does not quite assert the opposite, but writes as if conservatism 
is  ‘really’  primary  conservatism,  whereas  secondary  conservatism,  which  unlike 
primary  conservatism  looks  very  like  substantive  conservatism,  is  something  else 
(pig-headedness,  perhaps).  In  terms  of  kp+cp,  substantive  conservatism  is  not 
conservatism. There is obviously a split here. 
Secondly, with the exception of Beckstein, most commentators feel pressed to oppose 
substantive  conservatism  (or  secondary  conservatism)  with  another  type  of 
conservatism that is not centred on values unique to the conservative. Of these non-
substantive  conservatisms,  adjectival  conservatism  as  expressed  by  Brennan  and 
Hamlin  has  a  narrow  focus,  but  primary  conservatism  (Wilson  1941)  and  kp+cp 
(O’Hara 2011) are relatively rich in content. 
Epistemology 
Epistemology  is  the  central  vector  of  content  for  adjectival  conservatism.  For 
example, kp+cp claims that data and theories about society are uncertain and because 
of this we should be careful how institutions and practices are treated – the orientation 
is  sceptical.  Conservative  scepticism  is  not  the  thoroughgoing  Cartesian  kind  that 
doubts  everything.  Rather,  the  doubt  is  whether  we  (either  as  individuals  or  as  a 
collective) can be effective in gathering reliable information about the world, and how 
to act in order to achieve our aims, in the absence of a suitable scaffolding from the 
world itself. Brennan and Hamlin characterise adjectival conservatism as focusing on 
“normative  risk”  (2014,  234,  and  2004),  but  this  somewhat  underplays  the  key 
function  of  scepticism.  In  fact,  it  plays  two  complementary  roles  in  motivating 
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One way of putting this to bring out the duality of conservative scepticism is, in the 
words of Enoch Powell, “the Tory prejudice that, upon the whole, things are wiser 
than people, that institutions are wiser than their members and that a nation is wiser 
than  those  who  comprise  it  at  any  specific  moment”  (Powell  1990,  5).  This 
proposition needs to be taken seriously – it is of course a metaphor but is not merely 
fanciful anthropomorphism. Institutions do act as stores of knowledge, experience and 
expertise and in certain circumstances can be treated quite properly as independent 
agents (Douglas 1987, Fuller 2002, O’Hara 2002). Although they obviously don’t 
construct  themselves,  and  cannot  impose  patterns  of  behaviour  on  people  or 
communities, they are important in shaping the possibility of effective action in the 
world, and in retaining the information and, as Powell suggests, wisdom that a culture 
accumulates. Indeed, when we speak airily of ‘accumulated wisdom’, we should not 
ignore the need for a means for the accumulation to take place. Experience, if it is to 
be learned from, needs to be readily available, and our institutions, traditions and 
certain other constructs are essential for making that happen. 
To say that things are wiser than people works on two levels: it entails attitudes to 
both collectives and individuals in conservative writings. Many accounts focus on the 
larger policy role – not only much of the Reflections but also well-known pieces such 
as Oakeshott’s ‘Rationalism in politics’ (1991a), in which the ambitions of rationalist 
policymakers are attacked. Data is lacking, theory is underdetermined, the risk of top 
down  innovation  is  too  great.  Yet  there  is  also  a  micro-level  corollary  about  the 
boundedly rational individual and his limited cognitive capacity. The imperfection of 
humankind has always been a theme of conservative philosophy, yet although most 
commentators focus on the contention that people are morally flawed, conservatives 
will also emphasise that people are epistemologically fallible too, and that this has 
political consequences. 
In this section, I want to fill out the detail of conservative scepticism in more detail, to 
see how rich a project can be inferred from the bare bones of kp+cp. In the first 
subsection,  I  will  examine  the  macro  level  and  consider  whether  a  sceptical 
policymaker will inevitably be paralysed into inaction. In the next, I will move down 
to  the  micro  level,  and  consider  what  type  of  psychology  is  subtended  by  the 
adjectival conservative proposal. 
Epistemology and engagement 
As Oakeshott argued, a conservative-voting person might be quite adventurous – he 
might simply want government to leave him alone to pursue a radical idea of the good 
(1991b,  434).  For  the  individual  conservative,  on  Oakeshott’s  liberal  account,  the 
question of whether and how to act is not a political question per se. The conservative 
doesn’t  agonise  about  whether  to  do  something  exciting,  like  trek  along  the 
Annapurna Circuit. His concerns are that (a) society is stable enough to allow him to 
pursue his idea of the good, (b) government will not stop him doing it, and (c) if for 
some  reason  his  pursuit  of  his  idea  of  the  good  causes  some  conflict  with  other 
individuals’ legitimate pursuits, government will provide some kind of procedure to 
resolve the issue. The conservative isn’t restricted to cultivating his suburban lawn. 
However,  that  doesn’t  solve  the  dilemma  of  the  conservative  politician.  A 
conservative who conforms to the lugubrious stereotype of the master of inactivity 
will  struggle  in  today’s  politics.  He  will  need  to  persuade  a  mass  media  and  a 
Twittersphere  that  are  driven  by  novelty,  innovation  and  problem-solving  – 
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problems with negotiation – the classic technique for which is to state an unachievable 
goal that is anathema to one’s interlocutor, and allow oneself to be beaten down until 
a  successful  compromise  is  found.  But  if  the  conservative’s  starting  position  is 
epistemological  humility,  pluralism  and  compromise,  who  is  going  to  find  him  a 
convincing opponent?  Isn’t he obviously  going  to  cave in? Maybe a conservative 
politician properly so-called should simply bow out of the fray, like Lord Derby who 
“was not at all sure that the Conservative Party should hold office. To do so meant 
compromising with the process of change, with the risk of being egged on further than 
one intended by the opposition. In opposition, the party could bolster [Whig/Liberal 
Prime  Minister]  Palmerston’s  natural  conservatism”  (Charmley  1996,  2).  Perhaps 
predictably, although Derby led the Conservative Party for nearly 22 years, he was 
Prime Minister for fewer than three (and then reluctantly). 
Does the conservative politician have to abstain from action? 
Nevertheless, the conservative is not condemned to such unadventurousness. The risk-
based approach of kp+cp leaves room for political action. After all, no-one seriously 
accused Margaret Thatcher of lacking a talent for hard-nosed negotiation. Thatcher 
was often identified as a radical (correctly so on a number of occasions), but as I 
argue elsewhere (O’Hara 2013), her philosophy had prominent conservative aspects, 
at least until 1986 or so when she began to plot a measurably radical course. 
Risk-based  adjectival  conservatism  leaves  it  entirely  open  for  a  conservative  to 
demand change, even radical change. When the state of a political unit is extremely 
dire, then the risk of change will be diminished. “To make us love our country, our 
country  ought  to  be  lovely”  (Burke  1968,  172).  In  the  case  of  Thatcher,  it  was 
common ground across the political spectrum that the United Kingdom in the 1970s 
was “the sick man of Europe”, its economic situation was terrible, voters and citizens 
were  fed  up  with  strikes  and  power  cuts,  and  popular  culture  was  nihilistic  and 
anarchic. Although one conservative wing of the Conservative Party wished to make 
an accommodation with the trade unions, it was equally conservative to say that the 
current position was untenable and change was needed. 
Certainly, conservatism should not be automatically equated to conflict-aversion. A 
vital,  living  tradition  that  is  worth  preserving  will  very  probably  be  an  object  of 
discussion,  debate  and  even  controversy.  Vital  traditions  “embody  continuities  of 
conflict” (MacIntyre 2007, 222). The less controversial is the status quo, the happier 
the  conservative  will  be  (Wilson  1941,  29),  but  that  is  not  inconsistent  with 
MacIntyre’s point that a bit of argument and controversy is a sign that an institution or 
tradition is an important part of people’s lives. 
Thatcher’s first term included an attempt to get the public finances under control by 
lowering public spending, reducing the government’s involvement in the economy, 
and  to  provide  a  more  stable  business  environment  by  undermining  the  legal 
protections of trade unions. It was the last UK government to emphasise its lack of 
control  of  the  economy  (an  epistemological  humility  that  was  dropped  when  her 
second  chancellor  Nigel  Lawson  wished  to  take  credit  for  the  boom  of  the  mid-
1980s). All these were attempts to fix identified problems with British politics. Later 
in her period of office, the innovations for which Thatcher came to be known (e.g. the 
Big Bang deregulation of the financial sector) were more likely to have theoretical 
rather than practical backing, and to address no specific problem apart from perceived 
opportunity costs. If we consider Oakeshott’s nostrum that “an innovation which is a 
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disequilibrium, is more desirable than one which springs from a notion of a generally 
improved  condition  of  human  circumstances,  and  is  far  more  desirable  than  one 
generated by a vision of perfection” (Oakeshott 1991b, 412), it seems clear that her 
first term policymaking meets the condition while the second two terms abandoned it. 
So there is no conceptual problem with an activist conservative, even of the milk-and-
water adjectival type, as long as he is able to argue that the current situation is rotten 
enough to justify action. That leaves the problem that his sceptical epistemology will 
let him down when it comes to deciding what action is justified: “the weakness of 
conservatism appears in not knowing always what are the fundamental propositions 
supporting its manner of living, and in inability to judge the consequences of political 
and economic mutation” (Wilson 1941, 29). 
What should a conservative politician do? 
In practice,  the  weakness may  not  be  as  glaring  as  it appears in  the abstract. As 
Freeden points out (1996, 336ff), the conservative’s contributions to policy will often 
be intending to confound the innovator or the rationalist. The conservative is there to 
protect,  and  what  is  under  threat  is  usually  evident.  The  conservative’s  political 
discourse will be crafted around the threats he perceives. It is also important to go 
beyond “the boiling point of the moment” (Wilson 1941, 30). Wilson notes that social 
change is an interesting indicator of the ‘fundamental’ institutions and practices the 
conservative  will  seek  to  conserve:  “the  conservative  looks  upon  similarities  and 
dissimilarities  in  social  change,  and  the  ‘fundamental’  is  practically  always  the 
similarity between two periods” (Wilson 1941, 30). Neither of these heuristics is an 
essential part of conservatism, and would probably fall under Müller’s sociological 
dimension. But between them, Freeden’s suggestion to look at what radicals are trying 
to change, and Wilson’s idea that continuities over time will be valorised, can sharpen 
the conservative’s palette of policy options. They also take the sociological dimension 
away from Müller’s focus on interests towards something a little more informative for 
the student of ideology. 
Conservative nostrums, such as pessimism about human nature, help differentiate its 
predictive  task  of  understanding  change  from  the  analogous  task  for  radicals  and 
progressives. The conservative argues that at least some humans will always try to 
game any new system in creative and unpredictable ways, as they have always done. 
The only reason we understand how people work around today’s systems, and can 
therefore adapt to those systems’ inadequacies, is that the systems are in place and the 
unpredicted behaviour is there to observe. Indeed, some sociologists have gone so far 
as to argue that designed systems can only work if we leave room for the workarounds 
(Scott 1999). 
The conservative’s charge against the radical is that he is handicapped by having to 
present a system design that he cannot prove will survive the first contact with the 
enemy. The radical’s optimism about human nature works to his disadvantage. The 
conservative does not need to argue that it is correct to be pessimistic about human 
nature  (although many  conservatives  do  – this is  a bold  claim  and not needed to 
support his point). The weaker claim, that a system that functions successfully without 
requiring an optimistic view of human nature is more likely to function whether or not 
people  behave  well,  is  adequate  for  the  conservative’s  purpose.  The  conservative 
concludes that his own ideas about the future, even if not accurate in detail, are less 
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The situated mind 
Scepticism is important at two levels in conservatism, as noted above. As well as 
having things to say about high policy, conservatives also maintain that ordinary life 
is facilitated by a regimen of epistemological humility. If things are wiser than people, 
it follows that people are less wise than things. 
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of 
reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the 
individuals would be better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital 
of nations, and of ages. … Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it 
previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does 
not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, sceptical, puzzled, and 
unresolved.  Prejudice  renders  a  man’s  virtue  his  habit;  and  not  a  series  of 
unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature. 
(Burke 1968, 183) 
The psychology of epistemological weakness 
This  epistemological  frailty  has  been  amply  confirmed  by  generations  of 
psychologists  and  social  scientists  (Evans  &  Frankish  2009,  Kahneman  2011). 
Kahneman  draws  a  distinction  between  two  epistemological  pathways  within  the 
human psyche, which he calls System 1 and System 2. System 1 is a set of evolved 
responses to the immediate needs of a body in a potentially hostile environment, while 
System 2 is a set of rationalising methods for coming to a reflective, reason-based 
view.  System  1  is  an  automatic,  speedy  decision-making  process  which  has  little 
sense  of  voluntary  control,  deals  in  associativity,  neglects  ambiguity,  suppresses 
doubt, generates limited and basic assessments of the current environment, focuses on 
existing  evidence  (ignoring  the  possibility  of  absent  evidence),  gives  unduly  high 
weight  to  low  probabilities,  and  is  biased  to  confirm  rather  than  to  challenge 
hypotheses (Kahneman 2011, 105). These are characteristic of decision-making where 
time is short, the stakes are not high, or we are otherwise unreflective about our own 
cognitive behaviour. 
System 2 can correct these biases, but it imposes a surprisingly heavy cognitive and 
physical load when it operates (Kahneman 1973, Gevins et al 1997, Vergauwe et al 
2010, Kool et al 2010). Broadly speaking – given the giant gap between 18
th and 21
st 
century understanding of the mind, we can only speak broadly – Burke’s instincts on 
humankind’s  intellectual  limitations  were  sound.  We  need  systems  “of  ready 
application in the emergency.” His description in this part of the Reflections is little to 
do  with  high  policy,  and  everything  to  do  with  the  actions  and  decisions  of  the 
individual. The institutions and traditions of a society or culture provide the individual 
with resources to spread the cognitive load of choice and decision-making. 
System  1 economises  on the cognitive load.  In a sense,  Burke describes  a  proto-
System 3 where the load is not reduced, but shared across a society’s members (past, 
present and future). In the individualistic methodology of experimental psychology, 
this would be described as a series of social decisions to engineer the environment in 
such a way that System 1 becomes more reliable. Yet as those social engineering 
decisions  are  generally  unconscious,  and  are  often  emergent  from  a  series  of 
behaviours collected and aggregated at scale, there is a powerful temptation, which I 
propose not to resist, to use the metaphor of a System 3 that is not based solely in the 
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Indeed, the temptation is strengthened when we consider that, at least  sometimes, 
System 2, the reasoning part of the mind, is outperformed by an aggregation of instant 
System 1 decisions of a group of people. The micro and the macro can come together 
in the conservative tradition when a low opinion of expertise produces a respect for 
the wisdom of crowds. The practical wisdom and native wit of the common man, 
supported by stable and familiar institutions, can correct the ideas of experts. “In my 
course I have known, and … have co-operated with great men; and I have never yet 
seen any plan which has not been mended by the observations of those who were 
much  inferior  in  understanding  to  the  person  who  took  the  lead  in  the  business” 
(Burke  1968,  281).  The  mechanism  that  brings  the  observations  of  those  “much 
inferior in understanding” to bear is what I am calling System 3. In more recent times, 
the Internet has proved an enticing aggregation mechanism for conservative sceptics 
about government (Carswell 2012). 
The various bases of cognition 
System  3,  then,  is  the  “general  bank  and  capital”  of  reason,  and  people  who  are 
properly connected to System 3 – in other words, people familiar with the society and 
its assumptions – can socialise their reasoning about moral and other matters. Such 
familiarity will vary from person to person; some people are highly attached to and 
embedded in their societies, while others are more cosmopolitan and have a weaker 
but  still  significant  connection  with  a  range  of  societies.  Some  people  are 
marginalised – immigrants, say, or convicted criminals – and their connections and 
support networks are concomitantly weaker. Different people function differently in 
different strata of society – the manual labourer might stereotypically function better 
in the local pub than the senior common room, while the don’s functioning will have 
the opposite pattern. Sometimes an environment is consciously altered to make some 
people feel less at home there, and others more so – for example, the institutions 
surrounding football spectatorship were deliberately engineered (‘gentrified’) in the 
UK after a wave of hooliganism in the 1970s and 1980s to make it a more family-
friendly, middle class pursuit. All such changes alter people’s System 3 cognition, for 
better or worse. 
This thought takes seriously the words of the change principle that individuals and 
social institutions co-constitute each other, and brings us onto the close link between 
conservatism and the philosophy of situated cognition, the idea that cognition cannot 
properly be understood without regard to (aspects of) the context. Burke argued that 
cognition depends, to a certain extent, on traditions and institutions (see also Douglas 
1987),  and  the  socialisation  of  identity,  cognition,  reasoning  and  rationality  is  an 
important aspect of his philosophy. In a similar vein, (Marsh 2012) argues that the 
commonalities between Oakeshott and Hayek can be found in a shared commitment 
to situated or socialised mind, which (i) retains the individual as the locus of cognition 
while socialising its content, and (ii) justifies their epistemic scepticism. 
Other  types  of  situatedness  have  been  theorised  by  philosophers,  psychologists, 
sociologists  and  computer  scientists  (in  general,  these  thinkers  do  not  have 
specifically  conservative  agendas).  As  well  as  Burke’s  ideas,  it  has  also  been 
suggested that understanding cognition requires essential reference to: 
  Its embodiment in a physical form (Huxley 1950, Brooks 1991, Niedenthal 
2007). 
  The engineered, built and managed environment (Clark 1997). Conservatism, Epistemology, Risk and Mind    20 
  The sociolinguistic environment, or the language games we play (Wittgenstein 
1953). 
  The current state of scientific understanding (Putnam 1975). 
  The information that is generated about us and which is used to determine our 
choices (Floridi 2011). 
  Our social networks, offline and online (Somers 1994, Stryker & Burke 2000, 
Spears et al 2007, Ellison 2013). 
  The online environment generally (Carr 2010, Smart 2014). 
I have not considered any of the other seven types of situated cognition argument 
listed above in any detail, and this paper does not depend on resolving the relevant 
debates. My points are simply that (a) as well as Burke, a number of thinkers with no 
political agenda have gone down the route of describing mind in terms of its relations 
with  context  or  environment,  and  (b) these  types  of  situated  cognition  are  neither 
dependent  on  each  other  nor  mutually  exclusive,  so  one  can  pick  and  choose 
according to taste. Ultimately, they will all support a type of conservatism (with the 
possible  exception  of  the  embodiment  argument),  although  of  course  each  will 
motivate the preservation of a different aspect of the environment or context. It may 
be  that  the  particular  types  of  situated  cognition  that  the  conservative  affirms 
constitute further empirical facts held by him, marking him down, in Brennan and 
Hamlin’s terms, as a practical conservative. 
To summarise, then, epistemological scepticism bears on conservatism at two separate 
levels. First of all at the high level, the conservative policymaker doubts the ability of 
rationalists to determine their policies’ impact on a society (Oakeshott 1991a). The 
risk  the  conservative  detects  is  that  important  and  valuable  institutions  will  be 
damaged and unable to perform their (perhaps unnoticed) societal functions in the 
future. 
Secondly, at the lower level, citizens’ behaviour and understanding of the world are 
inextricably  tied  to  their  social,  cultural  and  institutional  context.  Their  System  1 
thinking  can  be  augmented  by  effective  System  3  heuristics  which  exploit  deep, 
intuitive and unconscious knowledge of (and confidence in) their embedding society. 
Change that society too radically, and people will be forced to fall back on flawed 
System 1 thinking, or to reason slowly and laboriously using System 2. They will 
therefore make poor decisions, morally and otherwise, for themselves and society. 
An ethical dimension emerges 
The spectre raised by change and innovation is not simply the introduction of flawed 
decision-making, but that potential violence might be done to a person’s identity. As 
Oakeshott has it, “change is a threat to identity … [b]ut a man’s identity (or that of a 
community) is nothing more than an unbroken rehearsal of contingencies, each at the 
mercy  of  circumstances  and  each  significant  in  proportion  to  its  familiarity” 
(Oakeshott 1991b, 410). 
Tracing scepticism through to a view of situated cognition, an ethical argument for 
conservatism emerges alongside the practical ones. It is this: if people’s identities, and 
the contents of their thoughts, attitudes and beliefs are at least partially formed by 
their relationship with their social, physical or informational environment, and if we 
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continuity of the relevant aspect of the environment, and to take the risk of change 
seriously.  The  change  principle  above  includes  a  statement  about  the  risks  to 
beneficial institutions and norms, and under this rubric must come the potential for 
identity  formation,  support  for  preference  formation  and  the  socialisation  of 
individuals within a society. The benefits of institutions and norms are not just felt at 
the  policy  level;  they  are  also  important  psychologically.  Because  they  are 
psychological benefits, they demand an ethics of protection, and so via what may 
sound like a practical set of nostrums like kp+cp comes the ethical and moral force of 
conservatism. 
But note that this doesn’t purport to be a derivation of an ought from an is; it doesn’t 
ground ethical principles in epistemology. As well as the sceptical epistemological 
premise, an ethical premise (that we should be concerned to protect the autonomy of 
citizens) is also in evidence. Given that ethical principle, the sceptic can show the 
ethical value of conservatism. 
In this section I have been putting some flesh on the bare bones of the adjectival 
conservative.  If  we  are  now  talking  of  values,  is  there  a  danger  that  such  a 
conservative is inevitably going to be a substantive conservative too, thereby helping 
confirm Beckstein’s point that true conservatism is substantive? The derived ethical 
principle may look like the part of Cohen’s account of the status quo bias, that things 
are valuable in virtue of their relations with existing people (2011). However, this is 
only part of Cohen’s account, and the ethical dimension I describe here is derivative 
from  ideas  stemming  from  the  epistemological  analysis,  rather  than  being  an 
independent  axiom.  Hence  this  ethical  dimension  doesn’t  show  the  adjectival 
conservatism we have been fleshing out to be a type of substantive conservatism as 
well. All the values it contains are likely to be shared by non-conservatives. 
Conclusion 
I appreciate that the foregoing only scratches the surface of this somewhat deep topic. 
My  aim  has  been  twofold.  First  of  all,  I  have  tried  either  to  defend  the  idea  of 
adjectival  conservatism  as  an  authentic  form  of  conservatism,  or,  failing  that,  to 
demonstrate  that  epistemological  considerations  are  vital  for  any  kind  of  sensible 
conservatism, by presenting the kp+cp conception of conservatism. I am not sure I 
have achieved either of these. I am genuinely uncertain as to whether kp+cp is solely a 
species  of  adjectival  conservatism,  or  whether  it  is  an  amalgam  of  adjectival, 
substantive  and  practical  conservatism,  but  it  certainly  is  a  species  of  adjectival 
conservatism. Hence, if my arguments have hit the mark, then at a minimum I would 
claim a place in the conservative pantheon for us adjectivalists. At a maximum, I 
would throw out all non-adjectivalists. 
Secondly, I have also tried to demonstrate that this kind of conservatism is not a 
“decaffeinated  construct”,  as  the  kp+cp  amalgam  was  once  dismissed  (Economist 
2011). Granted, the conservative who adopts the kp+cp scheme would do less than 
many governments now do. This is not necessarily a bad thing. When (O’Hara 2011) 
appeared,  many  reviewers  remarked  that,  in  the  words  of  one,  “the  [British 
government’s  current  and  supposedly  successful]  intervention  in  Libya  would  not 
have  passed  muster”  (Ford  2011).  The  aftermath  of  that  intervention  shows 
conservatism’s longer and more pessimistic view might perhaps have been a more 
accurate and sensible one. Other views in the book that were strongly contested upon 
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see that the British government is determined to push forward with the HS2 high 
speed rail project, despite the lack of evidence in its favour – and a warning not to try 
to  reform  the  National  Health  Service,  an  undertaking  now  recognised  by  senior 
Tories as their “worst mistake” (Iacobucci 2014). So in defence of (O’Hara 2011) I 
would suggest that caffeinated politics have an unfortunate tendency to keep one up 
all night. 
Apologies for the self-justification, which I realise is inappropriate for an academic 
paper, but I have wanted to get that off my chest for three years. However, the main 
thing  I  wished  to  add  in  conclusion  was  that  despite  all  that,  epistemological 
scepticism is not a bar to effective political action, and that at least some of Margaret 
Thatcher’s actions are evidence of that. I also argued that despite the epistemological 
focus of scepticism, when we follow through its dual role in conservative ideology, 
some ideas in social psychology amounting to a theory of mind are also suggested. 
Hence  adjectival  conservatism  is  not  empty  of  entailments,  and  it  is  an  essential 
component of any rich conservative account of the world. 
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